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Original Post Date: 2010-08-01 Time: 21:00:02 Posted By: News Poster
According to a latest report, the UPDF has deployed about 7000 troops inside Central African Republic to hunt down Kony. The report released June 24 by Enough, a project of Center for American Progress to End Genocide and Crimes, details how Kony nearly walked into the UPDF fire in the CAR town of Djemah and lost a bodyguard.
The UPDF surprise attack left 25 LRA fighters dead and a few others captured and is deemed as the most deadly assault the Ugandan army has inflicted on the LRA in CAR. The report also highlights that lack of intelligence and key logistical and operational support to UPDF, which would have helped the army capture Kony and senior LRA leaders.
Kony and his LRA fled to CAR after the December 2008 UPDF strike on their bases in Garamba forest in eastern DR Congo during the offensive codenamed Operation Lightning Thunder.
Kony walks into UPDF fire
The attack of October 2, 2009, in Djemah remains the most devastating blow the Ugandan army has inflicted on LRA groups in CAR. About 25 LRA fighters were killed and a few were captured, including two “wives” of Kony, who was himself also almost caught.
Kony was leading a large group of LRA that stepped up their attacks on civilians in late August 2009. The rebels attacked Maboussou on August 27, 2009 and killed three people, injured one man seriously and raped one woman. Eight people were abducted but five later escaped back. Of the three who remained with the LRA, a 12-year-old boy was killed near Djemah for not keeping up with the group. “He fell on the ground and could not walk anymore,” said one witness. “One fighter smashed his skull with a club.”
According to two witnesses, Major Olanya, Kony’s younger brother, commanded the attack on Maboussou. The group later joined Kony in the nearby Kere. The abducted were made to kneel in front of Kony, who “allowed them to live.” One 14-year-old girl was given to Olanya as a “wife,” and the boys were assigned to two different LRA groups.
Kony’s group moved north toward Djemah on the southern tip of a huge forested area called Zemongo Reserve. One team from Kony’s group attacked Fouka, only reachable from Djemah by a boat on Ouara River. Meanwhile, Kony remained inside Zemongo. According to one child who was with Kony, the LRA leader planned to enter Djemah in the morning after his fighters had secured the town.
At 3 a.m., on the way to Fouka, with two abductees in tow, the LRA commander bayoneted one man to death, worried he would raise the alarm. At 4 a.m., under very heavy rain, LRA fighters gathered almost everyone from the village and forced them to sit in an open space and prepare food. Two people managed to escape undetected and one swam across the river and alerted the UPDF troops in Djemah. The UPDF responded rapidly by taking the boat to Fouka from Djemah. The soldiers reportedly shot in the air first to force the rebels to leave and not harm the people they had taken. Most of the rebels ran immediately toward the bush, but a few returned fire and dragged some of the abductees they had already tied and loaded with food into the bush with them. The LRA managed to take seven people that night. According to one witness in Kony’s camp, Kony initially thought the shots were by the LRA and started to walk toward Djemah. But as LRA fighters appeared running toward him, Kony retreated immediately.
During their escape, the LRA killed eight more people, having already killed two near Djemah. Of the seven people the LRA abducted, four were girls and three boys. The day after the attack, Kony ordered that all three boys be killed as revenge for the number of deaths the LRA suffered in Djemah. The LRA killed 13 people in total from Djemah. The UPDF likely killed 25 LRA fighters in Djemah. Two were killed in Fouka but the rest were killed in the bush as the UPDF continued the chase for days after the initial attack. “We kept running,” said a witness in Kony’s group, “and the UPDF almost caught up with Kony, killing one of his bodyguards.”
This incident powerfully demonstrates how–with greater international assistance such as intelligence sharing, logistics, and transport–apprehending Joseph Kony is a distinctly achievable goal. It also underscores the hard fact that a failure to apprehend Kony will only lead to further war crimes against the civilian population in CAR and beyond.
UPDF kills top LRA commander
Kony’s group, which included about 80 fighters and more than 100 abductees, first settled in Gougbere. It appears that the LRA commanders did not think the UPDF would follow them into CAR. In the first three weeks of September, two LRA commanders, Major Okello Kalalang and Brigadier Santos Alit, were killed and Major Okot Atiak was captured, all north of Obo, around Gougbere, in three separate incidents, and the element of surprise may have been a significant factor in the UPDF’s early successes. Again, this speaks to the importance of assistance that would allow the UPDF to move more quickly, decisively, and with credible intelligence.
On September 9, 2009 the UPDF bombed Kony’s camp in Gougbere where he was allegedly injured. Kony’s group fled to Nzo, near the Sudan border where he received medical help from Sudanese traders coming into CAR. Later, Kony’s group attacked Maboussou and moved to Djemah.
Kony ordered his commanders in CAR and DRC to go to CAR for a meeting north of Djemah. Kony had likely identified the large Zemongo forest as an ideal place like Garamba in DRC.
Brigadier Bok Abudema, one of the LRA’s oldest and most senior commanders, led a large group from DRC to Djemah as he had been ordered by Kony to join him. “We walked for a month trying to find Kony,” said the boy, “until the Ugandan soldiers attacked us.” Abudema and three LRA fighters were killed on December 31, 2009, north of Djemah.
UPDF commanders say that in the aftermath of the foiled attack on Djemah, the LRA was thrown into disarray. Kony’s group moved south to Dembia and then east along the Congolese border. On March 7, 2010 Kony crossed from Bassigbiri in CAR to northwest of Doruma in DRC. Kony went to Garamba and crossed into South Sudan in mid-April of 2010. The whereabouts of the LRA commander at the moment remain unclear, though he is likely in Congo.
Civilians praise Ugandan troops
Ugandan soldiers entered CAR in early 2009 but only set up base in Obo in July 2009. There are between 5,000 and 7,000 UPDF soldiers in CAR at the moment with bases in Obo, Mboki, Zemio, Dembia, Djemah, and Sam Ouandja. In practice, the Ugandan military presence dwarfs the size of the country’s own military. Given the small number of CAR military forces present in the area, the UPDF is the only force capable of addressing the LRA threat. The UPDF presence has ensured a certain level of security but has not stopped LRA attacks altogether.
The majority of people interviewed in five different towns in CAR said that the UPDF had behaved professionally. “The first UPDF soldiers here were wild,” said one person, “but after the commander arrived last summer, things improved.” There were four reported cases of rape in Obo and harassment in Djemah committed by UPDF soldiers. Colonel Rwashande, overall UPDF commander in CAR, said undisciplined soldiers were court martialled and that a military court was going to Obo to try two soldiers accused of assaulting two women. In Djemah, UPDF commanders have conducted frequent informational meetings with local authorities and the population. The UPDF has also tried to win the goodwill of people in Obo by allowing civilians to use the UPDF field hospital in Obo and bringing in medical supplies from Kampala for the use of the local population. The local population, however, is frustrated with the inability of the UPDF to finish off the LRA.
“The UPDF are too slow and weak,” said a man who was abducted and spent time with the LRA. “The LRA always knew when the UPDF were coming and outran them.” Frequently UPDF soldiers are slow, mostly because they are dependent on food and water rations delivered by helicopters. A guide used by the UPDF to track a large LRA group led possibly by Kony said that the UPDF travelled in a group of 300 and that they had to wait for the supply helicopter for days at a time. “The closest we got to the LRA group was four days behind them,” he said.
Logistics present the biggest challenge for the UPDF, a fact readily accepted by UPDF officers as contributing significantly to failure in the fight against the LRA. Helicopters are needed to carry food and water from Obo to forward bases and bring back injured soldiers. The helicopters used currently are too few and inefficient. To transport jet fuel from Obo to Djemah, for instance, the UPDF uses a Mi-17 helicopter which burns seven drums of fuel but can only carry eight drums. Lack of fuel and technical expertise also accounts for at least two other UPDF helicopters not being used at the moment. Other concerns include lack of water for the troops, especially in places far north in CAR such as Sam Ouandja.
Kony planned long war during Juba talks
While the Juba peace talks were still ongoing, Kony, at the time based in the Congolese Garamba National Park, sent raiding parties to CAR. Led by Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, LRA fighters abducted 130 people in February and March of 2008.
The LRA’s first target in CAR was Bassigbiri town which was attacked on February 25, 2008. The LRA abducted about 60 people, who were then taken back to Garamba. On March 5 and morning of March 6, 2008, a group of 80 LRA led by Odhiambo attacked the evangelical Africa Inland Mission’s church neighbourhood in Obo. Of the 73 people who were abducted, 29 have since returned.
As in Bassigbiri, the LRA looted food and other supplies during the attack in Obo, even though international organisations were at the time providing truckloads of foods to the rebels in an effort to bolster the Juba peace process. The LRA planned for future war despite continuing to participate in the peace talks. “Kony ordered the raids,” said a Ugandan former LRA fighter who participated in the attack, “to collect more soldiers for us.”
Original date published: 4 July 2010
Source: http://allafrica.com/stories/201007061236.html?viewall=1